Politics
The Coalition’s strategy – catch the next wave
Sydney Morning Herald political editor Peter Hartcher believes that Dutton will defy the teal tide and await the next wave to the right, and lists five aspects of Dutton’s strategy.
He won’t take the party that far left
Dutton has warned the survivors not to over-react, tacitly acknowledging that many voters were turned off by Morrison. That’s a reasonable interpretation, but is Dutton any more loved and respected? The first post-election Essential poll asked “If Peter Dutton was leader of the Liberal Party, would that make you more or less likely to vote Liberal, or would it make no difference?”. “More likely” scored 23 percent; “Less likely” scored 27 percent. Older voters in particular seem to be unenthusiastic about Dutton.
The rest of the Dutton strategy seems to be about not turning to the “left”. Forget the inner-city seats where rich people are concerned with peripheral matters such as climate change, integrity and gender – they’re lost. Go for the voters in the outer suburbs, the “forgotten people”, the striving small businesspeople. Hartcher quotes an analyst from a marketing firm who says that “the Coalition’s support is shifting towards poorer, less educated people born in Australia”, a continuation of the trend observed in the 2019 election.
It’s not the strategy Menzies would have pursued, but it has served elected dictators well – Orbán, Erdoğan, Bolsonaro. How similar is Australia to Hungary, Turkey and Brazil, however?
And why does Dutton continue to see climate change as a “left” issue?
Expect to hear it soon: “Labor cannot handle money”
Election of a Labor government is generally a harbinger of hard times ahead. We elected the Rudd government in 2007 just before the global financial crisis, the Whitlam government in 1972 just before the postwar Bretton Woods settlement collapsed, and the Scullin government in 1929 twelve days before the Wall Street crash and the onset of the Great Depression. These were all short-lived governments.
Alex Millmow has an article in The Conversation – A century-old double standard: like Labor leaders before him, Albanese is being told he can’t manage money – in which he explores the possibility that the Albanese government, like some of its Labor predecessors, will wear the blame for the economic conditions inherited from an indolent conservative government, and the likelihood of the press and financial community reverting to form and accusing Labor of financial and economic incompetence as it grapples with difficult fiscal conditions.
He points out that the Hawke government, elected in 1983, had better fortunes than the Scullin and Whitlam governments. It established a reputation for sound fiscal and economic management and held office for 13 years. Because the so-called “Volcker shock”, a rapid rise in interest rates that caused a world-wide recession, had hit Australia a year before Hawke was elected, the public had no reason to blame Labor for their difficulties. (Even so, credit-rating agencies downgraded Australia’s AAA rating during Hawke’s time in office.)
Will history repeat itself? Would Labor be in a more secure position if the election had been six months later as the effects of inflation, energy prices, interest rate rises and a fall in housing prices had become more closely associated with the Coalition?
Although Millmow doesn’t mention it, perhaps Labor can take some reassurance from the fortunes of the Curtin and Chifley governments, which won elections in 1943 and 1946 after Curtin took office in 1941, following the collapse of the conservative UAP-Country Party Coalition. The Coalition’s present travails have echoes of those earlier troubles.
Another post-election analysis: there was a lot of churn in Labor’s vote
William Bowe has drawn our attention to a post-election Mood of the nation survey by SEC Newgate. It contains few surprises about people’s major concerns: the cost of living, particularly food and gasoline prices.
The survey was conducted between May 23 and 27, by which time the rise in official interest rates was already public knowledge. That’s probably why concern about mortgage repayments rose from 11 to 15 percent (the percentage giving an “extremely important” assessment) between April and May.
Only those who have significant mortgage debt and prospective house buyers would be concerned about mortgage rates. On the other hand, almost everyone is affected by utility prices, but the survey revealed less concern about electricity and gas bills. Does this mean people react only when they are presented with the next bill, or conversely, that they have already considered a probable price rise and realize they can cope with it?
Its findings on how people voted confirm the presence of a significant proportion of the electorate who are fluid in their preferences: 29 percent of respondents, particularly women, switched to a different party or candidate from their 2019 choice, with the Greens and independents picking up their vote.
It also dispels any notion that Labor is slowly losing its loyal supporters, as one may infer from its 0.8 percent loss in primary vote. In fact there is a great deal of churn in Labor’s vote: 28 percent of those who voted Labor in this election had voted for someone else in 2019 (implying that a slightly larger proportion of people who voted for Labor in 2019 headed elsewhere in 2022). “Labor switchers were more likely to be middle-aged men and it has regained some traction with its traditional base” is the way this churn is summarized.
It finds that housing was not a decisive factor in the election, even though both main parties crafted policies around housing. Among those who switched to independents, dissatisfaction with Morrison, a desire to see more action on climate change, inept administration (e.g. Covid) and the desire to be represented by a local member of parliament were all significant issues.
Another finding was that 59 percent of respondents support an indigenous voice to Parliament, while only 16 percent are opposed, but it was a peripheral issue in the campaign.